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student-subjects? We analyze norm enforcement behavior of newly appointed police 
commissioners in both a game with positive externalities (based on a Voluntary Contribution 
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commissioners cooperate significantly more in both games and bear a higher burden of the 
sanction costs compared to non-police subjects. When the norm enforcement institution is 
endogenous, subjects favor rewards over sanctions, but police subjects are more likely to vote for 
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1. Introduction 
When a police officer pulls you over, a reward for not breaking the law is usually the last thing 
on your mind. Yet, in recent years numerous police forces around the world have experimented 
with “positive ticketing”, which involves giving out reward tickets and vouchers for good 
behavior.1 These reward programs go against the old paradigm of the corrective policing model 
(Becker, 1968). 
One obvious reason why police almost exclusively use sanctions is that.it seems unnatural to 
reward those who comply with the law—rewards are usually reserved for going above-and-
beyond a norm, if they are given at all. There may be additional reasons why police prefer 
sanctions to rewards for norm enforcement. Firstly, there may exist a pure framing effect:
sanctions may resonate more with norm enforcement in “destructive” contexts compared to 
“constructive” contexts. Norm violations involving active destruction may trigger more negative 
emotions than norm violations involving passive acts of omission (e.g., failure to contribute to a
public good). Secondly, sanctions may be more effective than rewards at norm enforcement when 
norm violation involves the destruction of wealth. Finally, one may conjecture the existence of a
pure police-specific effect. Specifically, police officers are more exposed to destructive contexts 
and disorderly elements of society. As such, they may have a stronger inclination to use sanctions 
(Skolnick, 1995).2
                                                          
1
For example, drivers in Sandy, Utah, were given vouchers for movie tickets for safe driving behaviors in 2013, and 
drivers in the south of France were given 20 Euro gas tickets for driving below the blood alcohol limit during 2014 
New Year’s celebrations. Youth in Decator, IL might receive a free food voucher for using crosswalks or 
skateboarding in designated areas, and Toronto Police have articulated hopes that positive ticketing will help 
facilitate communication and build trust in addition to encouraging good and legal behaviors (see 
http://www.positiveticketing.ca/default.aspx). While often targeted at youth, such programs may reward anyone 
behaving virtuously or simply not breaking the law. A positive ticketing program pioneer, Ward Clapham (a retired 
Canadian Mountie), estimates that over 25 countries currently use such programs to at least some extent (see 
http://news.msn.com/world/police-hope-positive-tickets-will-reduce-crime).
2
The comments of a police officer in the “Pops for Cops” program in Decatur, IL, illustrate this point: “Like many 
professional law enforcement officers, I brought a certain mentality to the job. I wanted to hunt down criminals –
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Social dilemmas are popular for studying cooperation and social norms because group 
welfare is at odds with the dominant strategy of selfish free riding behavior. Early laboratory 
experiments have shown that initial contributions in Voluntary Contribution Mechanism games 
are substantially above the Nash prediction, but decline steadily as the game is repeated (Isaac et 
al., 1984; Andreoni, 1988; Ledyard, 1995). Research has also shown that, in otherwise parallel 
games, there is a reduced willingness to cooperate when externalities are negative rather than 
positive, because the warm glow is stronger than the cold-prickle (Andreoni, 1995). However, 
cooperation can be sustained in the long run when punishment is available (Yamagishi, 1986; 
Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Gächter et al., 2008). Punishment is typically directed at those who 
violate the norm of cooperation, which is given by the average group contribution level. This 
finding is robust to various environmental conditions (Masclet et al., 2003; Bochet et al., 2006; 
Anderson and Putterman, 2006; Carpenter, 2007). Other studies have attempted to investigate the 
effectiveness of reward mechanisms to enforce the norm of cooperation (Dickinson, 2001; 
Andreoni et al., 2003; Walker and Halloran, 2004; Sefton et al., 2007; Rand et al., 2009; Sutter et 
al., 2010; Dugar, 2013). Most of them show that rewards are somewhat less effective than 
sanctions in enforcing cooperation. 
The originality of our paper is threefold. First, we experimentally investigate the 
effectiveness of punishment and reward institutions not only in a constructive (Giving Game) 
social dilemma context but also in an equivalent destructive (Taking Game) context. In the 
Giving Game non-cooperation is failing to contribute to a public account, whereas in the Taking 
Game, non-cooperation involves active withdrawals from a common account. The two games are 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
chase bad guys, kick in doors, get the bust. It was hunter vs. hunted… I can't escape the realities of my job – I have 
to hunt down criminals. But could I also work on the other end of the spectrum? Could I build positive relationships 
strong enough to keep youth out of trouble?”.  
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4
linear public good/bad games with the same dominant strategy Nash equilibrium of no 
cooperation.3 While the effect of sanctions/rewards is well documented in a positive frame, their
effectiveness is less well-established when the social dilemma is negatively framed. Using 
Common Pool Resource (CPR) games, some find that sanctions improve cooperation (Ostrom et 
al., 1992; Casari and Plott, 2003; van Soest and Vyrastekova, 2006), but others find the opposite 
result (Janssen et al., 2010; Cason and Gangadharan, 2014). In the same vein, the use of rewards 
to enforce cooperation in a CPR context has received less attention (exceptions include 
Vyrastekova and Van Soest, 2008; Stoop et al. 2013), even though its relevance to the real world 
is clear. One novelty of our design is that we can compare the impact of the various norm 
enforcement mechanisms in constructive versus destructive, but otherwise identical, linear social 
dilemmas.  This allows us to test for social dilemma framing effects on sanctions and rewards.  
The second originality of our paper is that we enroll a representative sample of new French 
police commissioners to form mixed groups with participants from a standard student subject-
pool. Our aim is to analyze whether police commissioners behave differently in terms of 
institutional choices and norm enforcement. This population is perfectly suited for our study 
because police commissioners have self-selected into a ‘mission-oriented’ occupation in the 
destructive context of crime deterrence, and because their training and core function are in law 
enforcement (Besley and Ghatak, 2005). Additionally, some of these commissioners had 
completed their training two years prior to our experiments, while others were still in training. 
This allows us to examine whether some experience with crime and enforcement affects behavior 
in our games. When comparing commissioners with non-police subjects, our intuition is that 
commissioners may have a stronger preference for sanctions due to both their occupational 
                                                          
3
Our Taking Game is therefore distinct from the Common Pool Resource game that represents a non-linear social 
dilemma game with an interior equilibrium in the choice space (Ostrom et al., 1992).
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selection and explicit training to favor sanctions over rewards (Raganella and White, 2004; Wu et 
al., 2004).4
,5 Our artefactual field experiment therefore contributes to discussion regarding the 
external validity of experiments by comparing career professionals with student-subjects (Dyer et 
al., 1989; Cadsby and Maynes, 1998; Cooper et al., 1999; Alatas et al., 2009; Carpenter and Seki, 
2011). In his survey, Frechette (2015) finds no evidence that conclusions based on standard 
student-subject pools cannot generalize to professionals, as well as to the literature on how 
experience affects framing effects (e.g., Gächter et al., 2009; List, 2003). 
Finally our third contribution is to vary the way the enforcement institution is implemented 
(exogenously or endogenously through a majority vote) so that we can test whether, as 
government agents, police commissioners are more willing to utilize an institution when it results 
from a democratic choice. We thus contribute to the literature on endogenous institutions in 
social dilemmas (Gürerk et al., 2006; Tyran and Feld, 2006; Kosfeld et al., 2009; Sutter et al.,
2010; see Vyrastekova and van Soest, 2003 for a common pool context).
Our experiment consists of four treatments in both Giving and Taking Game contexts:
Baseline, Reward, Sanction, and Vote. The Baseline treatment of the Giving Game is a linear 
public good game (public bad in the case of the Taking Game) without any enforcement 
institution. In the Sanction (Reward) treatment, a new stage is added. After being informed of 
                                                          
4
After running our experiment, we became aware of another study of trust and norm enforcement conducted with 
applicants to the German police by Friebel and Kosfeld (2013). The two studies differ in several respects. First, their 
study focuses on how individuals self-select into an occupation based on their behavioral characteristics. Instead, we 
focus on comparing the use and efficacy of norm enforcement institutions in various environments given that 
subjects are police or non-police. We do not try to determine whether the behavior of police subjects is due to 
behavioral self-selection into the occupation or whether it results from the training in law enforcement they receive. 
Second, their subject-pool consists mainly of students in the final year of the high school, who may apply to the 
police. Instead, most French police commissioners hold a Masters degree. Third, their design is based on a trust 
game with a third-party and individuals can use both rewards and sanctions in the same periods (in ours it is one or 
the other), and it does not include endogenous institutions. Our studies are therefore complementary.
5
Prendergast (2007) shows that among public employees, if social workers are more likely to be biased in favor of 
their clients, police officers are more likely biased against their clients, i.e. those who break the law. If behavior in 
law enforcement transposes to norm enforcement, commissioners may be more inclined to sanction than reward. 
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6
each group member’s contribution, subjects can sanction (reward) others at personal cost. Finally, 
in the Vote treatment, subjects vote in a preliminary stage for their preferred institution (reward 
or sanction), and the majority vote determines the institution that is implemented for all rounds. 
Our results show that socially desirable behavior (i.e., contributing in the Giving Game or 
non-extracting in the Taking Game) is higher in the positive compared to the negative context; 
the existence of norm enforcement increases socially desired behavior; and police subjects 
contribute more (extract less) than non-police subjects. We also find that, after controlling for a
possible selection bias in the decision to use the institution, the intensity of both sanctions and 
rewards is higher in a negative context compared to a positive one. Interestingly, we find that 
police subjects enforce norms more than non-police subjects and particularly when the institution 
results from a majority vote. This helps explain the fact that the presence of more police subjects 
in a group raises its efficiency. Though all subjects prefer rewards, police subjects are relatively 
more likely to vote for sanctions. Perhaps relatedly, we also find that subjects are more likely to 
vote for the sanction institution when the vote occurs later in the game, because subjects will 
have had longer exposure to cooperative decay and norm violation.  
2. Experimental design
Our design consists of four treatments: Baseline, Reward, Sanction, and Vote. The Baseline 
allows us to compare behavior against results established in the literature. The Reward and 
Sanction treatments add the possibility of assigning costly reward or punishment points, 
respectively, as a way of enforcing norms of cooperation. Finally, the Vote treatment implements 
an endogenous enforcement institution by allowing subjects to vote as to whether the reward or 
sanction institution should be used. These treatments are administered in both positive and 
negative frames. Therefore, we have a 4x2 mixed design (4 treatments within-subjects, and 
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Taking or Giving Game as between-subjects factors). Police and non-police subjects were 
matched randomly in groups of five players, using an anonymous partner matching protocol.6
2.1. Treatment parameters 
Baseline treatments:  In the Baseline Giving Game treatment, each of the five homogenously 
endowed subjects allocates 20 ECU (Experimental Currency Units) to a private or a group 
account. Payoffs, as a function of the contribution of subject i, xi, are defined as follows: 
                                    ÿi
GG
= 20 xi + 0.3 x j
j=1
5
                                                                 (1) 
In contrast with Fehr and Gächter (2000), we give feedback regarding each other member’s 
contribution after each period for consistency with our other treatments.
In the Baseline Taking Game treatment, each of the five group members may withdraw wi Î
[0,20] from the group account. The payoff function of subject i is the following:  
  
 
 
i
TG
= w
i
+ 30 0.3 w
j
j=1
5
                 (2) 
It can be easily seen from (1) and (2) that the two games are equivalent with 
{ }20  i 1,...,5i iw x= - " Î
Sanction treatments: The sanction institution is implemented exogenously. Each period 
now consists of two stages. The first stage is identical to the decision stage in the Baseline 
treatment. In the second stage, the subjects have the opportunity to assign costly sanction points, 
                                                          
6
Several reasons motivated our choice of using a partner matching design. The first reason is the necessarily limited 
number of police-subjects, and a stranger matching requires more participants to get sufficient independent 
observations. Second, our main variables of interest (framing and police effects) should not be directly affected by 
the matching protocol. Finally, police officers mention themselves that the relationship with criminals shares several 
features of a long term-relationship. Indeed, police officers are typically assigned to districts of relatively limited size 
where they often interact with the same individuals. Furthermore, if criminals are not necessarily confronted with the 
same commissioners in each instance, repeat interaction is still possible due to the prevalence of recidivism. 
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P, to each other group member. The payoff function, shown in the case of the Taking Game, 
becomes: 
                                                 
 
ÿ
i
TG
= (w
i
+ 30ÿ0.3 w
j
j=1
5
ÿ )ÿ cPji
jÿi
ÿ ÿ kPij
iÿ j
ÿ                                             (3) 
where is the total cost of sanctions assigned by subjects j to subject i, with c indicating the 
per-unit cost of each point received (c=2 ECUs).7 kPij
iÿ j
ÿ is the total cost to subject i of the 
sanctions she imposes on all subjects j, with k=1 ECU being the cost to i of each sanction point 
assigned to any other player. A subject can assign a maximum of 10 sanction points to each other 
player. The total cost of points received cannot exceed the subject’s earnings from the first stage. 
Reward treatments: These treatments are similar to the Sanction treatments except that 
instead of punishing others, each subject can reward them by assigning reward points, R. Each 
reward point assigned costs k=1 ECU and each reward point received increases one’s payoff by 
c=2 ECUs. The payoff function, again shown in the case of the Taking Game, is: 
                                           
 
ÿ
i
TG
= (w
i
+ 30ÿ0.3 w
j
j=1
5
ÿ )+ cR ji
jÿi
ÿ ÿ kRij
iÿ j
ÿ                                              (4)
where cR ji
jÿi
ÿ is the total rewards gain assigned by players j to player i and kRij
iÿ j
ÿ is the total cost 
to player i of points assigned to others. A maximum of 10 points can be assigned to each other 
player and the gain of the total points received cannot exceed the subject’s earnings from the first 
stage. 
Vote treatments: the sanction or reward institution is implemented endogenously by adding 
a preliminary stage where subjects vote only once for whether the Reward or Sanction institution 
                                                          
7
In Fehr and Gächter (2000) and in most following studies on sanctions in VCM games, the cost ratio is 1:3. We 
chose a weaker 1:2 ratio because we wanted to hold this ratio constant for reward and sanction points. We feared that 
using a higher ratio for reward points would lead subjects to assign points to others not to enforce the cooperation 
norm, but to create reciprocity and increase payoffs. A lower ratio should, we thought, limit this motivation. 
cPji
jÿi
ÿ
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9
should apply to the subsequent rounds in the treatment. Voting entails no monetary cost, the 
majority vote institution is implemented, and there is no feedback on individual votes of others.8
2.2. Experimental procedures 
The experiment was programmed using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). All sessions 
were conducted at the GATE (Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Economique) lab in Lyon, France. 
There were nine sessions in total (five Taking Game and four Giving Game sessions). Within a 
session, the Baseline (B) treatment was always played first, and Reward (R) and Sanction (S) 
treatments were always adjacent (but counterbalanced in order). The Vote (V) treatment was 
counterbalanced to be either before or after the Reward and Sanction treatments, which allows us 
to examine institutional experience effects on reward/sanction preferences. Table 1 displays 
session details, including the treatment orderings administered. 
In a session, subjects played ten periods in the Baseline and seven periods in each of the 
three other treatments.9 It was common knowledge that, while the composition of the group was 
fixed throughout the game, the group member ID numbers displayed on the feedback screens 
were reshuffled at each period so that it was impossible to reciprocate the action of a specific 
group member in the previous period. This was intended to prevent the possibility of individual 
reputation formation and to avoid counter-punishment (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Denant-Boemont 
et al., 2007; Nikiforakis, 2008) or counter-rewarding (Stoop et al., 2011). The final earnings in 
these tasks were the sum of payoffs from all 31 periods.  
                                                          
8
Our procedure differs from Sutter et al. (2010) where subjects could vote between standard VCM, reward, and 
punishment by approval voting; voting was costly, voluntary, and repeated until unanimity was achieved.
9
Initially, we planned to run 10 periods in each of the four treatments. Unfortunately, and despite a pilot session with 
our usual subject-pool, we realized during the first session that some subjects were very slow to make decisions. 
Therefore, we decided to reduce the number of periods to 7 after the Baseline treatment. We kept the same structure 
for the remaining sessions. For comparisons in the data analysis, we use periods 1 to 7 for all treatments except for 
the Baseline.
A
C
C
E
P
T
E
D
 M
A
N
U
S
C
R
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
 
10
Each session involved 20 subjects, 8 to 10 of whom were police commissioners. Participants 
were not aware of the characteristics of the other participants: students did not know that they 
were interacting with police subjects. The right part of Table 1 indicates the distribution of the 
groups based on the number of police subjects in the group. In 27 out of the 36 groups of 5 
members (75%) there were either 2 or 3 police subjects. Thus the commissioners and students are 
not perfectly evenly balanced across groups but the distribution does not differ across frames. 
Upon arrival, and after informed consent was obtained, subjects drew a ticket from an
opaque bag assigning them to a specific terminal in the laboratory. Experimental instructions 
were distributed for each part after completion of the previous part (see Appendix). Instructions 
used neutral wording such as contribution (Giving Game) and withdrawal (Taking Game). 
Sanctions (rewards) were labeled as “points that decrease (increase) others’ payoffs”. After 
reading the instructions aloud, we used a questionnaire to verify each subject’s understanding and 
any questions were answered in private. Before subjects played the Taking or the Giving game, 
we elicited their risk attitudes and degree of trust.
10
 Sessions lasted two hours on average. 
Average earnings were €26.19 (S.D.=4.39), which were paid in private in a separate room. 
2.3. Subject pools 
In total, 180 subjects from two different pools participated in this experiment. The regular pool 
includes 93 subjects who were recruited via the ORSEE software (Greiner, 2004). Most were 
undergraduate students from local engineering and business schools; a minority of subjects were 
older participants, either campus employees or retirees.  
                                                          
10 To elicit risk attitudes we used the Holt and Laury (2002) procedure. We found no significant difference between 
subject pools (the mean numbers of safe choices out of 10 were 5.83 (1.78) and 5.82 (1.71) for police and non-police 
subjects, respectively (Mann-Whitney test, two tailed, p=0.910). Then, participants played a trust game (Berg et al., 
1995) in both roles under the strategy method. No significant difference was found either in trusting behaviors (the 
mean amounts sent by player A to player B out of 10 were 2.69 (SD 1.77) and 2.41 (SD 1.88) for police and non-
police subjects, respectively (p=0.448). Feedback on these two tasks was only given at the end of the session. 
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The other subject-pool consists of 87 volunteers who had recently passed the very 
competitive national exam of police commissioners. We have two main types of subjects within 
this pool. The majority (73 of 87) were still studying in the elite national school of police 
commissioners (Ecole Nationale Supérieure de la Police, ENSP, a French “Grande Ecole”), the 
only school for police commissioners in France, located near Lyon. This sample is representative 
of the population of French newly appointed police commissioners since each cohort includes 40 
students who spend two years at ENSP (meaning that the participation rate for the students at 
ENSP is above 90%). During their training they spend 14 months as interns in operational 
services; the rest of the time, they are trained in human resources management, intelligence 
services, management of public order. A minority (14 subjects) had finished training at ENSP 
two years prior and either had a permanent position as police commissioner or was in an 
internship at the time of our experiment. Specifically, at the end of training new commissioners 
will have to lead specialist departments or police districts and they are immediately appointed to 
small jurisdictions or are deputy commissioners in medium-sized town police stations. They are 
directly involved in police duties (maintaining public order, homeland defense, investigations,
road safety, policing of organized crime or money laundering, etc.). They direct the work of 
policemen and lead critical operations.11 These subjects, who have therefore had more crime 
exposure than those still in training, participated in our experiment during a post-training return 
to ENSP. Compared to our non-police subjects, police subjects are older (32.82 ± 7.37 year old, 
min=23, max=48 vs. 24.82 ± 9.22 year old, min=18, max=64) and more typically male (79.66% 
vs. 44.26%). Due to these differences, we systematically control for age and gender in our 
                                                          
11
We want to specifically highlight that these subjects are not police officers with some supervisory duties but
rather, individuals trained as police commissioners, who oversee or will oversee entire city police forces.
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regression analysis.12
3. Theoretical predictions 
3.1. Standard predictions 
We first derive predictions based on rational and selfish money maximizing agents, in which case 
the predictions are similar for police and non-police subjects. The equilibrium in a negative frame 
(Taking Game) is the same as in a positive one (Giving Game). Thus, we will merely describe 
predictions as a function of the enforcement institution and not the framing of the social dilemma.  
In the Baseline treatments, it can easily be seen from equations (1) and (2) that the dominant 
strategy Nash equilibrium is for all subjects to place all 20 ECU in their private account (xi = 0) 
contributing nothing or, alternatively, extracting all from the public good (wi=20) in each round 
of this finitely repeated game. In equilibrium, each subject earns 20 ECU and total group earnings 
are 100 ECU. In contrast, the strategy leading to the Pareto optimum is xi = 20 (or, wi = 0), which 
generates total group earnings of 150 ECU (30 ECU per subject). 
In both the Sanction and the Reward treatments, the only Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, 
whether played once or finitely repeated, is also xi = 0 or wi=20 for all i and no use of sanctions 
or rewards because both are costly. In the Vote treatment, self-interested individuals should be 
indifferent between available institutions. Contribution or withdrawal behavior should not be 
affected by the choice of enforcement institution since sanctions/rewards are not credible. Thus, 
                                                          
12 With non-standard subject pools, it is especially important to avoid experimenter demand effects, which may be 
motivated by social desirability, because they could generate differences of behavior. As remarked by Zizzo (2010), 
what is crucial is the belief that the subjects hold about the experimenters’ objectives and how they can be related to 
the real objectives. Our subjects were very likely not able to identify the aim of our study. First, they had to 
participate in several tasks, making the environment multi-dimensional and our objective not transparent. Second, 
only the directors of the school were aware of the content of our tests and they committed not to reveal it to the 
participants. Third, it was made clear to the participants before the experiment that the results were collected for 
scientific reasons and that no individual data would be communicated to the School at any time. Furthermore,
participants committed not to reveal the experimental protocol to other subjects before completion of all the sessions. 
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with money-maximizing self-interested play, the equilibrium prediction is the same across all 
enforcement institutions, games, and subject pools. Observed differences must therefore be 
attributed to behavioral factors resulting from a desire to enforce behavioral norms and/or the 
psychological impact of a positive vs. negatively framed social dilemma decision environment.   
3.2. Behavioral predictions 
Our first set of conjectures concerns the norm of cooperation in the Baseline. Introducing other-
regarding preferences might take the form of advantageous inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 
1999), social preferences for fairness and efficiency (Charness and Rabin, 2002), or imperfect 
conditional cooperation (Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010). Such theories 
predict that cooperation may result with sufficient numbers of cooperators in a group, though 
contributions may still decline over time. One may therefore conjecture that people with other-
regarding preferences should contribute positive amounts of their endowment in all treatments.  
Regarding subject pool effects, we predict that police commissioners will be more 
cooperative than others, given their stronger norm of civic cooperation and because they self-
selected into a public good oriented occupation where helping others is key motivation 
(Raganella and White, 2004). Indeed, civil servants, whose job is to serve public interests, might 
be more cooperative because people in mission-oriented jobs are usually intrinsically motivated 
agents (Besley and Ghatak, 2005) who place more value on the output of public organizations 
(François, 2000).13 This prediction is also based on evidence from cross-cultural studies showing 
that cooperation in social dilemmas is higher in countries with stronger norms of civic 
cooperation and weak laws (Herrmann et al., 2008).  
                                                          
13
Investigations on the motivation for entering the police emphasize the importance of non-monetary dimensions, 
such as the willingness to help people and social status (Hageman, 1979; Moon and Hwang, 2004; Raganella and 
White, 2004; Tarng et al., 2008; Wu et al., 2009). Social contribution is also ranked as the first determinant of job 
satisfaction by police officers (Carlan, 2007).
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Based on the previous literature, we also expect to observe framing effects that promote 
higher cooperation in the Giving Game than in the Taking Game (Andreoni, 1995; Park, 2000; 
Messer et al., 2007). We summarize our first set of conjectures as C1: 
C1: a) Police subjects cooperate more than non-police subjects. b) Cooperation is more likely in 
the Giving Game than in the Taking Game. 
Our second set of conjectures is related to exogenous norm enforcement institutions. Sutter 
et al. (2010) demonstrate that the use of rewards in equilibrium is predicted by the Charness and 
Rabin (2002) model of social preferences only if there are enough subjects who value social 
welfare as strongly as their own payoff. Punishment in equilibrium is predicted by the inequity 
aversion model only under very restrictive conditions. Based on previous evidence, we conjecture 
that a fraction of the subjects will sacrifice resources to sanction and/or reward and that rewards 
will be preferred to sanctions because they are more efficient (Sefton et al., 2007; Rand et al.,
2009; Sutter et al., 2010). Because their occupation is mission-oriented (Besley and Ghatak, 
2005) and because it requires expertise in law enforcement to fight deviant behavior (Wu et al., 
2009), we conjecture that police subjects will be willing to bear a disproportionate burden of 
enforcement costs. Finally, regarding framing effects, we expect more sanctions in the Taking 
Game both because we predict less cooperation and because norm violation involves active 
destruction of the public resource.  Such an act of commission may trigger negative emotions 
more than norm violation by an act of omission (i.e., failure to contribute in the Giving Game). In 
the same vein, not withdrawing money from the existing group account may also trigger more 
positive emotions than non-contributing in the Giving Game.  
We summarize our second set of conjectures as C2:
C2: a) Police subjects enforce norms more than non-police, particularly with sanctions and in 
the negative frame. b) More sanctions (rewards) are assigned in the Taking Game.   
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Our last set of conjectures is related to the endogenous norm enforcement institutions. 
Because police fight crime with threats and sanctions, we conjecture that police commissioners 
will be more inclined than non-police subjects to vote in favor of sanctions. We also predict that, 
as government agents, police will use a norm enforcement institution more intensely when it 
results from a vote. Finally, we predict that endogenously selected institutions will promote more 
cooperation (Tyran and Feld, 2006; Kosfeld et al., 2009; Sutter et al., 2010). We summarize our 
third set of conjectures as C3:  
C3: a) Police subjects vote more in favor of the sanction institution than others. b) Subjects, 
especially police subjects, use enforcement more intensively when the institution results from a 
democratic vote. c) Endogenous institutions increase cooperation relative to exogenously 
implemented institutions. 
4. Results 
4.1. Cooperation 
In what follows, ‘contribution’ refers to the amount not extracted from the group account in the 
Taking Game or the amount placed in the group account in the Giving Game. Figures 1 and 2 
display mean contributions over time per treatment in the Giving and Taking games, respectively.  
Both figures exhibit the standard decay of contributions over time in the Baseline 
treatments.14 Focusing first on the exogenous enforcement institutions, we find that mean 
contributions are significantly higher in Sanction treatments compared to Baseline (Mann-
Whitney test, p<0.001 and p=0.025 in the Giving and the Taking Games, respectively).15 Mean 
                                                          
14 Since we were not able to randomize all the possible orderings of treatments, due to an insufficient number of 
police-subjects, the Baseline treatment was always played first. This may have transferred learning to the following 
treatments (Andreoni, 1988). It is therefore important to check that our treatment differences are not driven by a 
different behavior in the Baseline. We tested that the mean contribution behavior in the Baseline is not different 
across the various sequences of treatments (BRSV, BSRV, BVRS and BVSR), by means of Kruskal-Wallis tests. 
The mean group contribution in the first ten periods gives one independent observation. No significant difference 
across sequences of treatments was found (p=0.141 in the positive frame and p=0.679 in the negative frame). 
15
Unless if specified otherwise, all the non-parametric tests reported in the paper are two-tailed Mann-Whitney tests
in which the group mean’s behavior (contribution, for example) over the set of periods in one treatment is taken as 
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contributions are also higher in the Reward treatments compared to Baseline treatments (p=0.029 
and 0.051).16 Sanctions tend to outperform Rewards, but the difference is not significant (p=0.291 
and 0.204). These findings are consistent with previous literature. Figures 1 and 2 also indicate 
that when a vote resulted in the Sanction institution, cooperation increases dramatically compared 
to Baseline (p=0.007 and 0.001, in Giving and Taking Games, respectively). Endogenous 
sanctions also increase contributions compared to exogenous sanctions in the Giving Game 
(p=0.065), but not in the Taking Game (p=0.221). Compared to Baseline, the increase in 
contributions from endogenous rewards is not statistically significant (p=0.148 and 0.484 in the 
Giving and the Taking Games, respectively), nor is the increase seen with exogenous rewards 
(p=0.511 and 0.526).  This is intriguing, as we could have expected that the positive signal given 
by a majority voting in favor of rewards would have resulted in a higher willingness to 
contribute. Regarding framing effects, our data show that contributions are higher in the Giving 
compared to Taking Game, but the differences are not significant. Baseline mean contributions 
(ECUs) are 6.49 in the Giving Game and 5.46 in the Taking Game (p=0.324). In Sanction 
treatments they are 13.10 (Giving Game) compared to 10.91 (Taking Game) (p=0.347), and in
Reward treatments they are 10.94 (Giving Game) and 8.32 (Taking Game) (p=0.156).  
We turn next to comparisons across subject-pools. Figure 3 displays average contribution 
levels for police and non-police subjects, by treatment in the Giving and the Taking Games. This 
Figure suggests that in all treatments police subjects cooperate more on average than non-police. 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
one independent observation. This implies that when we compare contributions in two treatments, we do not take 
into account the fact that a treatment may have a different location in a sequence across groups. This is a limitation 
because it does not take into account sequence order effects. This constraint comes from the limited number of 
groups in each treatment of each sequence. Therefore, the results of the tests should be taken cautiously.   
16
Our non-parametric tests are qualitatively similar when one restricts our data analysis to the first seven periods in 
all treatments including the Baseline (see footnote 9). The only exception is that the difference between the Baseline 
and the Reward treatments in the Taking Game is no longer significant. Our econometric analysis is however 
unchanged whether or not we restrict the number of periods in the Baseline to the first seven periods. 
A
C
C
E
P
T
E
D
 M
A
N
U
S
C
R
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
 
17
However, we find no statistically significant subject pool effects in any treatment (p>0.10 in all 
cases). If we pool the Taking game and the Giving game together, then we find that the Vote-
Sanction treatment police subjects contribute significantly more than non-police (18.42 vs. 17.03 
ECUs, p=0.088). The fact that most non-parametric tests fail to identify significant effects here is 
not that surprising since our subject-pools differ on characteristics not controlled for in the non-
parametric analysis. We therefore appeal to parametric data analysis to further investigate 
differences across subject pools. 
Table 2 reports the marginal effects of two random-effects Tobit regressions analyzing the 
determinants of the contribution decision. Random effects control for the lack of independence of 
the contributions of a given subject across decision rounds and Tobit models are justified by the 
fact that contributions are censured both at 0 and 20 ECU. We pool the data from all treatments 
and we standardize contributions of individual i in period t as the dependent variable by defining 
contributions in the Taking Game as the amount (20-wit) that is not withdrawn. Independent
variables include a dummy variable for the Giving Game and treatment dummies (Baseline is the 
omitted reference treatment). Order of treatment captures whether the treatment was played 1
st
,
2
nd
, 3
rd
, or 4
th
 within the session. We also include controls for Period (1-7) and a Last period 
dummy to control for end-game effects. Model (2) adds a Police subject dummy, a Police with 
experience dummy for commissioners in an active position and variables for age, gender, trust 
and political orientation.17
Table 2 shows that, relative to Baseline, cooperation is higher when norm enforcement is 
possible. This is especially true with Sanction, as its coefficient is significantly higher than the 
                                                          
17
“Trust” corresponds to the amount sent by player A to player B in the trust game. The “political orientation” 
variable corresponds to the response to the following question in the post-experimental questionnaire: «In politics 
one usually speaks of right and left. Where do you situate yourself on a scale from 1 on the left to 10 on the right? ».
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coefficient on the Reward treatment. We also find that endogenous sanctions (Vote Sanction) lead 
to even higher contributions than exogenous sanctions. T-tests for all these pairwise comparisons 
in the models give p<0.001. In contrast, the coefficient on Vote Reward is significantly smaller 
than the coefficient on Reward (p=0.008). This could result from the fact that a majority vote in 
favor of sanctions is a clearer signal against free-riders than a vote in favor of rewards. These 
estimated effects are robust across models. 18
Table 2 also shows that the police-subjects contribute significantly more than the non-police 
subjects.19 This finding supports conjecture C1a. Experience in police work has no additional 
effect. Once we control for other variables, contributions are significantly higher in the Giving 
Game than in the Taking Game, which supports C1b. Not surprisingly, cooperation declines over 
time, both across periods within a treatment and across treatments within a sequence. In 
additional estimations (available upon request), we also tested whether the framing effect was
different across subject pools by including an interaction term Police Subject* Giving Game. This 
variable is not significant, indicating that some experience with real world norm enforcement 
does not impact framing effects on cooperation in our experiments.20 We also fail to find any 
significant effect of a variable capturing the number of police subjects among the other group 
members, which is not surprising since this information was unknown to the subjects.  
These findings are summarized in Result 1. 
                                                          
18
We also ran these regressions after adding interaction terms between the Vote Reward and the Vote Sanction 
treatments, respectively, and a binary variable capturing the fact that the subject voted or not against the majority of 
his group. These terms are not significant in any model, showing no evidence of a crowding-out effect of not 
belonging to the majority on contributions (regressions available upon request).
19
Gächter et al. (2004) also report that non-students contribute more than students but their results are from a one-
shot VCM environment as opposed to our multi-period environment. In what follows, our additional results 
regarding norm enforcement and preference for punishment over rewards helps us attribute our subject pool effects 
to the special attributes of police officers, as opposed to non-students.
20
This contrasts with other studies finding that real world experience reduces framing effects (e.g, List, 2003; 
Gächter et al., 2009).
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Result 1. a) Police subjects contribute significantly more than non-police subjects. b)
Contributions are significantly higher in the Giving Game than in the Taking Game. c)
Cooperation is higher when norm enforcement is possible. d) Sanctions are more effective than 
rewards. e) Endogenous sanctions lead to higher contributions than exogenous sanctions. 
4.2. Sanctions and Rewards  
Figure 4 shows the average assigned enforcement points per treatment and subject-pool.  It shows 
that subjects are willing to use both rewards and sanctions to enforce norms, even at personal 
cost. This figure also shows no systematic tendency to use sanctions more intensively relative to 
rewards, except when the institution is endogenous. In this case, subjects are more willing to 
reward than punish in the Giving Game (Mann-Whitney test, p=0.093), but not in the Taking 
Game (p=0.513). Figure 4 suggests that police subjects enforce norms more intensively than non-
police subjects in all treatments. Finally, it shows that the mean number of both sanction and 
reward points is lower in the Giving Game than in the Taking Game.  
Table 3 analyzes the determinants of norm enforcement by means of a random-effects GLS 
model (column 1) and two random-effects Tobit models (columns 2 and 3). The dependent 
variable is the number of assigned points (both punishment and reward points) by each player i to 
each other player j within her group. The independent variables in Table 3 are mostly similar to 
those in Table 2. In model (1), we include controls for the Giving Game and for each enforcement 
institution (Reward treatment is the reference category). Controls are included for order of 
treatment in the sequence, period of the game, a dummy for last period and demographics. Model 
(2) adds controls for the points received in the previous period and dummies for police subjects. 
Finally, Model (3) includes several interaction variables to check whether police subjects’
decisions differ across treatments. Table 3 reports marginal effects. 
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Model (1) shows that subjects assign significantly fewer punishment points compared to 
reward points, and the number of points assigned declines over time and over the sequence of 
treatments, possibly because the use of norm enforcement is less necessary once it has been 
previously used within a group. It also shows that subjects tend to assign fewer points in the 
Giving game compared to a negative frame, although this effect fails reaching significance 
(p=0.11). Model (2) indicates that police subjects engage significantly more resources in norm 
enforcement than others and model (3) shows that, in general, police subjects distribute more 
sanctions than others but not more rewards. Police subjects also use both rewards and sanctions 
significantly more than others when the institution is implemented by vote.   
The Tobit regressions shown in Table 3 are based on the strong assumption that independent 
variables affect the decision to punish (reward) and the intensity of punishment (rewarding) to the 
same degree. However, this may not be the case. Thus, alternative Heckman two-step estimation 
procedures are reported in Table 4 to separately analyze the determinants of sanction points 
assignment (columns (1) to (3)) or reward points assignment (columns (4) to (6)) by a subject to 
each other group member. Specifically, a selection equation is first estimated by means of a
random-effects Probit to explain the binary decision to punish (reward) (columns (1) and (4)). We 
then explain the intensity of punishment (rewarding), conditional on the decision to punish 
(reward), corrected for a potential selection bias via the introduction of the inverse of the Mill’s 
ratio (IMR) from the selection equation as an explanatory variable. This second equation is 
estimated as a random-effects Generalized Least Squares in columns (2) and (5) for sanctions and 
rewards, respectively. The independent variables in the selection equations are mostly similar to 
those in Table 3. In addition, we add variables measuring a positive deviation (Pos Dev Avg) and 
the absolute value of a negative deviation of the contribution of the subject being assigned points 
from the rest of the group average (|Neg Dev| Avg). We also include the Avg Contr Others
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variable that measures the effect of others’ contributions (excluding the target’s contribution but 
including the subject’s contribution) on one’s own decision to assign points. The second-step 
GLS regressions include the same variables as the selection equations except for the time trend 
variables (period and end game) that allow us to identify the model. In columns (3) and (6) we 
add interaction terms to check whether police subjects’ decisions differ when the institution is 
chosen by the majority of members in the group.  Table 4 reports marginal effects. 
The left panel of Table 4 indicates that the probability of assigning sanctions declines over 
time. Column (1) shows that older participants are more likely to sanction than younger subjects. 
Subjects contributing more (less) than the group average are less (more) likely to be punished,
and subjects are less likely to punish the more others contribute. There is evidence of blind 
negative reciprocity, which suggests that retaliation is also important in our experiment, as in 
Herrmann et al. (2008). This effect is stronger in a positive frame as shown by the positive 
coefficient associated with the interaction variable Points received in t-1*Giving Game.
Complementary estimates (available upon request) in which we interact Police with Received 
points in t-1 show that being a police subject has no effect on negative reciprocity. Finally, the 
Giving Game variable captures a positive coefficient, suggesting that subjects are more likely to 
punish in a giving context compared to a destructive context. However, this effect is 
counterbalanced by the fact that the intensity of punishment is significantly higher in the Taking 
Game, which partly supports our conjecture that a negative frame triggers more emotional 
arousal.21 In column (1), the coefficient associated with police subjects with more experience is 
significant (p=0.090), suggesting that these subjects are more likely to punish free riders than 
                                                          
21
The fact that the Giving Game variable captures a positive and significant coefficient in the selection model 
contrasts with the findings on the intensity of punishment. On the one hand people may be more willing to contribute 
to the second order public good (if one considers the punishment itself as a public good) in the Giving Game, which 
may motivate them to punish more (binary decision). On the other hand, emotions triggered by deviations may be 
stronger in the Taking Game, which may translate into a higher intensity of punishment in this game.  
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others. Moreover, columns (2) and (3) show that police subjects assign significantly more 
punishment points than non-police subjects and this effect is stronger when punishment results 
from a majority vote (model (2)), in particular for more experienced commissioners (model (3)).  
The right panel of Table 4 reveals that the probability to reward also declines over time while 
it increases if the institution results from a majority vote. Subjects are more likely to reward 
above-average contributors, and more likely to reward in general when others contribute more 
(model (4)). There is also evidence of blind positive reciprocity and complementary regressions 
(not reported here) show no impact of being a police subject on blind reciprocity. Being more 
trustful significantly increases the probability to assign reward points.  
The Heckit estimates indicate that, after controlling for the selection bias (the IMR 
coefficient is significant), the intensity of rewards is significantly lower in the Giving Game 
compared to the Taking Game, which is consistent with our conjecture.22 Surprisingly, the 
intensity of rewards is lower in the vote treatment. Finally, like for sanctions we observe that 
police subjects are more likely to assign reward points when the institution results from a 
majority vote (models (5) and (6)).   
To sum up, four results are of particular interest. First, subjects enforce norms more with 
reward than sanction institutions (Table 3). Second, police subjects enforce norms significantly 
more than non-police subjects  (Tables 3 and 4). Overall, this supports our conjecture C2a. We 
attribute these police subject results to the fact that police work is one where law enforcement is 
almost entirely by use of sanctions, and both training and experience with crime and law breaking 
in their occupation may explain their higher intensity of punishment. Third, police subjects tend 
                                                          
22
The IMR is significant, indicating that it is important to respect the sequential structure of the rewarding decision
and analyze separately the binary decision to reward and the intensity of rewards. The IMR was not significant in the 
sanction estimates, indicating that simple GLS models would have provided rather similar findings.
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to use both norm enforcement institutions more when they result from a majority vote (Table 4).
This police-specific “democracy effect” might result from the civic values in the occupation of 
police officers. Fourth, after controlling for the potential selection bias in the binary decision to 
use rewards or sanctions, the intensity of both punishment and rewarding is significantly higher 
in the Taking Game context (Table 4). This supports our conjecture C2b. Our main findings 
regarding norm enforcement are summarized in Result 2.  
Result 2. a) Police subjects enforce norms significantly more than non-police, especially with 
sanctions. b) Police enforce norms significantly more when the enforcement institution results 
from a majority vote. c) Conditional on the decision to enforce norms by assigning points, the 
intensity of both sanctions and rewards is higher in the Taking Game 
An analysis of efficiency indicates that sanctions increase cooperation the most, rewards 
increase overall efficiency, and efficiency is systematically higher in the Giving Game than in the 
Taking Game (see descriptive statistics on first-stage and final payoffs by treatment in Appendix 
Table A1 and random-effects GLS estimates in Appendix Table A2). However, it should be kept 
in mind that the limited number of periods does not allow the long-term efficiency effect of 
sanctions to fully develop (see Gächter et al., 2008). Appendix Table A2 also shows that, due to 
their higher cooperativeness and norm enforcement, police subjects do not earn more than the 
other subjects, but groups populated with more police subjects have significantly higher earnings. 
4.3. Voting on norm enforcement institutions
Table 5 displays the distribution of individual votes and the group majority vote for the reward 
and sanction institutions for each pool of subjects in the Giving and Taking Games. It also 
indicates a proxy for satisfaction in each game for each pool of subjects, i.e. the percentage of 
subjects whose vote corresponds to the majority vote. Table 5 shows that the proportion of 
subjects preferring the reward over sanction institution is significantly higher in both game 
frames (binomial tests, p<0.01 for both), and there is no difference between reward institution 
A
C
C
E
P
T
E
D
 M
A
N
U
S
C
R
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
 
24
preference across the two games (χ
2
test, p = 0.941). As a result, 81.3% of the 16 groups in the 
Giving Game and 75% of the 20 groups in the Taking Game implement the reward institution.
Although the majority of police subjects also voted for reward, they were more inclined to vote 
for sanction than non-police (Taking Game: 32% vs. 24%. Giving Game: 35.1% vs. 20.9%). The 
difference is, however, not significant (χ 2 tests, p=0.156 and p=0.373 for the Giving and Taking 
Games, respectively).  
Table 6 reports the marginal effects of Probit regressions analyzing the individual 
determinants of a vote for the sanction institution against the reward institution. In model (1), we 
include controls for the Giving Game, the late occurrence of the Voting treatment in the sequence 
to check whether experience with each institution matters in the voting decision, a dummy for 
police and demographic controls. We also include a dummy variable indicating whether the 
subject has contributed nothing in the first period of the Baseline treatment, i.e. before receiving 
any feedback on others’ behavior in this experiment. This variable aims at testing whether 
individuals who immediately free-ride in this experiment are less likely to vote for sanctions than 
others. Models (2) to (5) report separate estimates for subjects with and without experience with 
the two enforcement institutions. Models (2) and (3) add the BRSV dummy variable to check 
whether having experienced the sanction institution instead of the reward institution just before 
voting favors or not the vote for the sanction institution.  
Table 6 indicates that having experienced both institutions before voting increases the 
preference for sanctions, as shown by the significant positive coefficient of the Vote Treatment 
Last variable in model (1). Sanctions become more appealing after observing the decay of 
cooperation and the typically higher marginal impact of sanctions relative to rewards. This is 
consistent with Gürerk et al. (2006). In contrast, we find no effect of having experienced either 
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the reward or the sanction institution immediately before the vote. Supporting conjecture C3a, 
model (1) indicates that police subjects have a 11.7% higher probability to vote in favor of the 
sanction institution than non-police and models (2) and (5) confirm that police subjects exhibit a
higher preference for sanctions. Police subjects with a longer experience in the police are much 
more likely than the other subjects to vote in favor of the sanction institution before 
experimenting the institutions in the game (model (5)). A possible interpretation is that being 
exposed to deviant behavior and norm enforcement either during the game or in real life (as it is 
the case for police officers) reinforces confidence in sanctions. Interestingly, a comparison of 
estimates (1) and (5) suggests that real experience and experience in the lab are substitutes. 
Finally, people who free ride at the very beginning of this experiment are no less likely than 
others to vote for the sanction institution, and a more conservative political opinion increases the 
probability of voting for sanctions when one has not yet experienced this institution (model (5)).
This leads to our final result: 
Result 3. a) More experience with the social dilemma game and norm enforcement increases the 
preference for sanctions. b) Police subjects are more likely to vote for the sanction institution 
compared to other subjects. 
5. Discussion
Our study examined norm enforcement by carrots or sticks in two distinct frames of a social 
dilemma. A field-experiment element was the use of both French police commissioners and 
standard student subjects. We have three main sets of findings.  
First, a negatively-framed “destructive” context (Taking Game) leads to a lower level of 
cooperation and to the assignment of more sanctions and rewards when subjects decide to use 
these institutions. One interpretation stems from the fact that negative (positive) norm violation in 
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the Taking Game could generate more negative (positive) emotions, which naturally resonates 
with the use of sanctions (rewards).   
Second, we examined subject-pool effects and showed that individuals in a mission-oriented 
occupation responsible for norm enforcement, like our new police commissioners, tend to be both
more cooperative in social dilemmas and willing to bear more of the costs of the norm 
enforcement. This is especially true when the enforcement institution uses sanctions. This 
translates into higher earnings not for police subjects themselves but for groups populated with 
more police subjects.  
Third, regarding the implementation of norm enforcement institutions, we show that a large 
majority of individuals generally prefer rewards over sanctions. This result extends that of Sutter 
et al. (2010) to a wider set of conditions. This preference may be due to a willingness to avoid the 
loss of efficiency associated with sanctions and/or the perspective of mutual benefits through 
positive reciprocity within groups. Interestingly, police subjects are more likely to enforce norms
with either institution when implemented by majority vote. This effect suggests that police 
subjects are particularly sensitive to the democratic implementation of the enforcement 
institution. Finally, we find that an endogenous sanction institution leads to higher contributions 
than an exogenously imposed equivalent institution. We also observe that police subjects prefer 
sanctions relatively more than non-police, and a longer exposure to free riding in the 
experimental game leads subjects to favor sanctions over rewards for norm enforcement. Our 
finding that both types of experience (experimental or in real life through exposure to crime in 
police work) lead to a stronger preference for sanctions is important because it lends some 
support to the external validity of evidence generated by laboratory games.  
We acknowledge, however, a number of limitations to our study. It would be desirable to 
recruit more experienced police commissioners. Indeed, this would allow us to better identify 
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whether the police-subject effect is due to intrinsic motivation and self-selection or to the role of 
experience in law enforcement. It would also allow us to understand whether the higher 
preference of more experienced police subjects for the sanction institution is due to more direct 
exposure to crime in the field or to immersion in police culture. Moreover, the low number of 
periods in our experiment penalizes sanction efficiency because the benefits of sanctions take 
time to develop (see Gächter et al., 2008), while the benefits of rewards are more immediate. 
Finally, it would be also interesting to test how our findings would be affected if groups were 
rematched after each interaction. Despite these limitations, we believe that it is important to 
expose norm enforcement mechanisms to a large variety of environmental and institutional 
conditions so as to evaluate their robustness and derive policy implications on institutional
design. 
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Table 1. Description of sessions 
Note: B: Baseline treatment; R: Reward treatment; S: Sanction treatment; V: Vote treatment.  
Table 2. Determinants of contribution levels  
Dependent variable: Random Effects Tobit models
Contribution (1) (2)
Sanction treatment 1.373***(0.110) 1.399***(0.111)
Reward treatment 0.837***(0.091) 0.853***(0.092)
Vote Sanction treatment 2.991***(0.229) 3.045***(0.230)
Vote Reward treatment 0.681***(0.088) 0.694***(0.089)
Giving Game 0.484**(0.189) 0.469**(0.194)
Order of treatment -0.150***(0.030) -0.153***(0.030)
Period -0.121***(0.011) -0.123***(0.012)
Last period -0.130**(0.062) -0.131**(0.063)
Police - 0.432* (0.224)
Police with experience - -0.342 (0.375)
Age - -0.007 (0.012)
Male - 0.066 (0.202)
Trust - 0.056 (0.051)
Political orientation - 0.023 (0.045)
N
Left-censored obs.
Right censored obs.
Log-likelihood
5580
1903
1643
-10524.828
5580
1903
1643
-10521.476
Note: This Table reports marginal effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 
0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively for the 2-tailed test. The 5580 observations correspond to the 180 subjects 
observed in 31 periods of game. 
Session Sequence Game # police/ total # 
subjects
# groups, by # police subjects in the group
0 1 2 3 4 5
1 BRSV Taking 10/20 - 1 1 1 1 -
2 BRSV Giving 9/20 1 - 1 1 1 -
3 BSRV Taking 10/20 - - 2 2 - -
4 BSRV Taking 10/20 - 1 - 3 - -
5 BVRS Taking 10/20 - - 2 2 - -
6 BVSR Taking 10/20 - - 2 2 - -
7 BSRV Giving 11/20 - - 2 1 1 -
8 BVRS Giving 9/20 - - 3 1 - -
9 BVSR Giving 8/20 1 1 1 - - 1
Total
Percentage
87/180 2 3 14 13 3 1
48.33 5.56 8.33 38.89 36.11 8.33 2.78
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Table 3. Determinants of sanction or reward decisions  
Dependent variable:          
Number of reward
or sanction points
Random Effects 
GLS
(1)
Random Effects 
Tobit
              (2)
Random Effects
Tobit
(3)
Sanction treatment
Vote Sanction treatment
Vote Reward treatment
Giving Game
Order of treatment 
Period
Last period
-0.072**(0.029)
0.004 (0.057)
0.032 (0.032)
-0.187# (0.115)
-0.147***(0.015)
-0.106***(0.007)
0.077* (0.043)
-0.085***(0.024)
-0.079 (0.052)
-0.020 (0.025)
0.072 (0.083)
-0.105***(0.012)
-0.066***(0.007)
-0.012 (0.036)
-0.125***(0.034)
-0.229***(0.089)
-0.057 (0.035)
0.069 (0.083)
-0.106*** (0.012)
-0.066***(0.007)
-0.012 (0.036)
Police
Police with experience
Police*Sanction treatment
Police*Reward treatment
Police*Vote Sanction treatment 
Police*Vote Reward treatment
-
-
-
-
-
-
0.189**(0.096)
0.045 (0.163)
-
-
-
-
- 
0.040 (0.161)
0.210**(0.100)
0.132 (0.099)
0.364**(0.140)
0.205**(0.101) 
Points received in previous period
Age 
Male
Trust 
Political orientation
Constant
-
0.011* (0.006)
0.168 (0.120)
0.040 (0.031)
-0.047* (0.027)
1.222*** (0.255)
0.056***(0.003)
0.006 (0.005)
0.001 (0.087)
0.021 (0.022)
-0.002 (0.019)
-
0.056***(0.003)
0.006 (0.005)
-0.002 (0.09)
0.006 (0.005)
-0.003 (0.019)
-
N 15120 12960 12960
Left censored obs. - 9954 9954
Log-likelihood - -11450.914 -11447.505
Note: This Table reports marginal effects for the Tobit models. Standard errors are in parentheses. GLS: Generalized 
Least Squares. ***, **, * and 
#
 indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10, and 0.11 levels respectively for the 2-
tailed test.  The 12960 observations correspond to the 180 subjects’ decisions regarding each of their four group 
members in the 18 periods of game where sanctions or rewards can be assigned (excluding the first period of each of 
the three treatments due to the introduction of the lagged variable points received in t-1).
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Table 4. Determinants of sanction and reward decisions  
Dependent variable:
Binary 
decision to 
punish
RE Probit
(1)
Intensity of 
punishment
RE GLS
(2)
Intensity of 
punishment
RE GLS
(3)
Binary 
decision to 
reward
RE Probit
(4)
Intensity of 
reward
RE GLS
(5)
Intensity 
of reward
RE GLS
(6)
Vote Sanction / Reward  
treatment
Giving Game
Order of treatment
Period
Last period
Received points in t-1
Received points in t-1
*Giving Game
Pos Dev Avg
|Neg Dev| Avg
Avg Contr Others
-0.016
(0.018)
0.061**
(0.030)
0.013
(0.009)
-0.016***
(0.003)
0.008
(0.013)
0.003**
(0.001)
0.005**
(0.002)
-0.005***
(0.001)
0.021***
(0.002)
-0.006***
(0.001)
-0.823
(0.940)
-1.011**
(0.473)
-0.151
(0.205)
-
-
-0.004
(0.026)
0.013
(0.039)
-0.018
(0.028)
0.081* 
(0.047)
-0.055*
(0.029)
-0.691
(0.945)
-0.991**
(0.475)
-0.362
(0.227)
-
-
-0.009
(0.026)
0.019
(0.039)
-0.015
(0.028)
0.085* 
(0.047)
-0.056*
(0.029)
0.015*
(0.008)
-0.014
(0.038)
-0.030***
(0.006)
-0.019***
(0.003)
-0.038***
(0.015)
0.008***
(0.002)
0.004*
(0.002)
0.015***
(0.001)
-0.029***
(0.002)
0.018***
(0.001)
-0.511***
(0.099)
-0.707**
(0. 338)
-0.236***
(0.051)
-
-
0.038***
(0.012)
0.031*
(0.017)
0.001
(0.016)
0.044
(0.030)
-0.055**
(0.022)
-0.510***
(0.099)
-0.710**
(0. 339)
-0.236***
(0.051)
-
-
0.038***
(0.012)
0.032*
(0.018)
0.000
(0.017)
0.043
(0.030)
-0.056**
(0.022)
Police
Police with Experience
Police*Vote
Police with experience
*Vote
-0.004
(0.029)
0.080*
(0.047)
-
-
0.771*
(0.460)
-0.898
(0.759)
2.372**
(0.971)
-
0.902*
(0.466)
-1.282
(0.783)
1.810*
(1.009)
1.501**
(0.697)
0.047
(0.041)
-0.023
(0.071)
-
-
-0.189
(0.376)
-0.034
(0.666)
0.640***
(0.137)
-
-0.208
(0.377)
0.077
(0.675)
0.679***
(0.140)
-0.366
(0.305)
Age 
Male
Trust
Political orientation
Inverse Mills’ ratio
Constant
0.004**
(0.001)
0.006
(0.026)
0.006
(0.007)
<-0.001
(0.006)
-
-
-0.005
(0.024)
0.020
(0.438)
-0.045
(0.105)
-0.081
(0.092)
-0.2613
(0.416)
4.551***
(1.508)
-0.008
(0.024)
0.053
(0.441)
-0.039
(0.106)
-0.087
(0.092)
-0.292
(0.416)
5.103***
(1.530)
0.003
(0.002)
-0.040
(0.039)
0.017*
(0.009)
<-0.001
(0.008)
-
-
-0.006
(0.019)
0.462
(0.342)
0.011
(0.092)
-0.078
(0.074)
-0.577***
(0.207)
4.528***
(0.956)
-0.006
(0.019)
0.471
(0.344)
0.011
(0.092)
-0.080
(0.051)
-0.575***
(0.207)
4.531***
(0.958)
N 5280 916 916 7680 2090 2090
Log-likelihood -1522.210 - - -2491.376 - -
R2 0.100 0.102 0.072 0.072
Note: This Table reports marginal effects for the probit models. RE: Random Effects. GLS: Generalized Least Squares. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively for two-tailed tests. The 5280 observations 
correspond to the 180 subjects’ decisions regarding each of their four group members observed in periods of game with a sanction institution 
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except the first period due to the introduction of the lagged variable Received points in t-1. The instrument variables are the trend variables 
period and last period. 
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Table 5. Preferences for norm enforcement institution 
Game
Vote for 
institution 
Individual votes Group Satisfaction rate
All Police Non-
police
Majority 
vote
Police Non-
police
N=100 N=50 N=50 N=20
Taking 
Game
Sanction
28
(28%)
72
(72%)
16
(32%)
34
(68%)
12
(24%)
38
(76%)
5
(25%)
62.5% 50%
Reward
15
(75%)
94.1% 81.6%
N=80 N=37 N=43 N=16
Giving 
Game
Sanction
22
(27.5%)
58
(72.5%)
13
(35.1%)
24
(64.9%)
9
(20.9%)
34
(79.1%)
3
(18.7%)
61.5% 22.2%
Reward
13
(81.3%)
87.5% 94.1%
 
Table 6. Determinants of the vote for the sanction institution 
Dependent variable:
Vote for sanction
All 
sequences
(1)
Experience
of institution
BRSV and 
BSRV seq.
(2)
Experience 
of institution
BRSV and 
BSRV seq.
(3)
No experience 
of institution
BVSR and 
BVRS seq.
(4)
No experience
of institution
BVSR and 
BVRS seq.
(5)
BRSV
Giving Game
Vote Treatment Last
Null contribution in period 1 
of the Baseline
-
0.008
(0.075)
0.107***
(0.039)
-0.075
(0.092)
-0.128
(0.106)
0.099
(0.106)   
-
-0.152
(0.101)                        
-0.110
(0.109)
0.116
(0.108)   
-
-0.160
(0.103)                        
-
-0.055 
(0.098)
-
0.075
(0.115)                          
-
-0.019
(0.086)  
-
0.101
(0.111)                         
Police 
Police with Experience
0.117*
(0.069)
-
0.199** 
(0.087)
-
0.171# 
(0.105)
0.116
(0.147)
-0.085
(0.127)
-
-0.137
(0.130)
0.438*** 
(0.163)
Age
Male 
Trust
Political orientation
-0.002
(0.004)
-0.016
(0.069)
-0.005
(0.019)
0.005
(0.015)
-0.008 
(0.006)
-0.057 
(0.110)
0.003 
(0.029)
-0.015 
(0.022)
-0.008 
(0.006)
-0.055 
(0.109)
0.006 
(0.029)
-0.015 
(0.021)
0.009 
(0.006)
0.064 
(0.081)
-0.004 
(0.018)
0.033* 
(0.020)
0.011 
(0.006)
0.044 
(0.081)
-0.007 
(0.018)
0.048*** 
(0.018)
N
Log-likelihood  
Pseudo-R
2
180              
-99.418
0.065       
100
-60.827
0.077
100
-60.566
0.081
80
-31.780
0.105
80
-29.953
0.156
Note: This Table reports marginal effects of Random Effects Logit models. Standard errors clustered at the group 
level are in parentheses. ***, **, * and 
#
 indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10, and 0.11 levels respectively, for 
two-tailed tests. The BRSV dummy variable corresponds to situations in which participants vote just after 
experiencing the sanction institution. The omitted variable corresponds to the BSRV sequence where participants 
vote just after experiencing the reward institution.  
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Figure 1: Evolution of the average contribution over time, by treatment - Giving Game 
Figure 2: Evolution of the average contribution over time, by treatment - Taking Game 
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Figure 3: Average contributions (i.e., amount relative to efficient outcome), in ECU 
Note: Mean values are indicated at the right of each bar. Standard deviations are indicated in 
parentheses. 
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Figure 4: Average enforcement points assigned
Note: Mean values are indicated at the right of each bar. Standard deviations are indicated in 
parentheses. 
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Appendix A. Instructions for a sequence Baseline-Vote-Reward-Sanction in the CPR game 
(translated from French) 
You are going to take part in an economic experiment on decision-making. Your earnings during this experiment 
will depend on your decisions and on the decisions of the other participants with whom you will interact. Thus, it is 
important to read these instructions attentively. 
All your decisions will be treated anonymously and confidentially. 
During the experiment, you will accumulate earnings, expressed sometimes in Euro, sometimes in ECU 
(Experimental Currency Units). At the end of the experiment, your earnings in ECU will be converted to Euro at a 
rate that will be indicated at the beginning of the parts. Your earnings in Euro will be paid to you in private, at the 
end of the session, in a separate room. 
Throughout the experiment, it is strictly forbidden to communicate with the other participants. 
This session consists of several parts. First, we are going to read together all the instructions related to the first part. 
Part 1 
During this part, you are playing alone: your decisions do not affect the payoffs of the other participants and their 
decisions do not affect your payoff. 
You have to make 10 decisions. Each decision consists of choosing between two options, option A and option B. 
Each option associates payoffs in Euro with probabilities that will be indicated on your computer screen. 
The following table is the same as the one that will appear on your screen. 
              Option A                                                                   Option B                                                    Option selection
Decision   Chances     Payoff   Chances     Payoff               Chances     Payoff    Chances     Payoff           A            B
1 10% €2 90% €1.6 10% €3.85 90% €0.1 O O
2 20% €2 80% €1.6 20% €3.85 80% €0.1 O O
3 30% €2 70% €1.6 30% €3.85 70% €0.1 O O
4 40% €2 60% €1.6 40% €3.85 60% €0.1 O O
5 50% €2 50% €1.6 50% €3.85 50% €0.1 O O
6 60% €2 40% €1.6 60% €3.85 40% €0.1 O O
7 70% €2 30% €1.6 70% €3.85 30% €0.1 O O
8 80% €2 20% €1.6 80% €3.85 20% €0.1 O O
9 90% €2 10% €1.6 90% €3.85 10% €0.1 O O
10 100% €2 0% €1.6 100% €3.85 0% €0.1 O O
For example. consider decision number 4. Option A gives you 40% of chances (40 chances out of 100) to obtain a 
payoff of 2 Euro and 60% of chances (60 chances out of 100) to obtain 1 Euro and 60 cents. Option B gives you 40% 
of chances to win 3 Euro and 85 cents and 60% of chances to win 10 cents. You will have to choose between option 
A and option B. 
The probability of the higher payoff in each option increases with the decision number. 
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For each of the 10 decisions, you will have to indicate your choice by clicking on the corresponding option in the 
right column of the table entitled “option selection “. 
Once your 10 choices registered, the program will randomly select 1 of the 10 decisions.  Each decision 
has the same chance to be selected. 
For this decision, the program will once again randomly select one number from 1 to 10 which will 
determine your payoff associated to the option you have chosen for this decision. 
Example
Suppose that the program selects the first decision for payment. For this decision, option A pays 2 Euro if 
the randomly selected number is 1 and it pays 1.6 Euro if the randomly selected number is a number from 
2 to 10. Option B pays 3.85 Euro if the randomly selected numbers is 1 and 0.1 Euro if the randomly 
selected number is a number from 2 to 10. 
If you chose option A for this first decision and the number randomly selected by the computer is 1, then 
your payoff from this part equals 2 Euro.  For all other decisions, the payoffs are calculated in the same 
way. 
In summary, you have to make ten choices between option A and option B. Then, the program will 
randomly select one of the ten decisions. After that, the program will randomly select the number that will 
determine the payoff corresponding to the option you chose. 
Note that you will be informed about you payoff from this part only at the end of the experiment. 
----- 
If you have any questions related to these instructions, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come 
to you and answer your questions in private 
-----
Instructions for Part 2 (distributed after completion of the previous part, and control questionnaire omitted 
to save space)
At the beginning of this part, the computer program forms pairs and assigns you a role: either A or B. You 
will never be informed on the identity of the other player. Each player A and B receives an endowment of 
10 ECU (Experimental Currency Units). At the end of the game, the total amount of ECU you have earned 
will be added and converted to Euro at the rate of  
10 ECU = 1.5 Euro 
Suppose that you are player A 
You have to decide the amount that you send to player B, from 0 to 5 ECU. 
Each ECU sent to B is multiplied by 3 by the experimenter. For example, if you send 2 ECU to B, this 
amount will be multiplied by 3 and player B will receive 6 ECU; if you send 5 ECU, B will receive 15 
ECU. 
Simultaneously, B decides the amount that he will send back to you for all the amounts that you can 
possibly send him. 
At the end of this part, the computer calculates your payoff as follows: 
Player A’s payoff = 10 – the amount sent to B + the amount received from B
Suppose that you are player B
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You are not informed before the end of the experiment about the amount sent to you by player A. Thus, 
you have to decide the amount that you want to send back to player A for all the amounts that you can 
possibly receive from player A. 
For each possible amount sent by A, you can send back from 0 ECU to 3 times this amount (because you 
receive the amount sent by A multiplied by 3). 
For example, if A sent you 2 ECU, you can send him back from 0 to 6 ECU. If A sent you 5 ECU, you can 
send him back from 0 to 15 ECU. If A did not send you any ECU, obviously you cannot send him 
anything back. 
The table below represents your screen when you have to decide about the amount to send back to player 
A:
 
At the end of this part, the computer calculates your payoff as follows: 
Player B’s payoff = 10 + 3*amount sent by A – amount sent back to A
You will not be informed immediately neither about your payoff in this part, nor about the amounts 
sent/sent back by the other player. You will be informed only at the end of the experiment. 
-----
If you have any questions related to these instructions, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come 
to you and answer your questions in private 
-----
Instructions for the 10 next parts (distributed after completion of the previous part) 
During the next parts all the transactions will be conducted in ECU (Experimental Currency Units). At the 
end of the session, the total amount of ECU you have earned in each of the following parts will be added 
and converted to Euro at the rate of : 
100 ECU = 1 Euro 
The computer program will randomly form groups of 5 participants each. During all the next parts of this 
experiment, you will interact with the same 4 other persons. You will never know their identity. 
Description of each part
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At the beginning of each part, a total amount of 100 ECU is assigned to the group of 5 participants. This 
amount is put on a group account. The group account pays 30% of its amount to each of the 5 group 
members.  
Each group member can withdraw ECU from this group account and put them on his individual account. 
Each one decides on the individual amount to withdraw from the group account, from 0 to 20 ECU 
included. 
Each part runs in the following detailed manner. 
- At the beginning of each part, 100 ECU are put in a group account. The group account pays you and 
each of the other group members 30% of its amount.  
- Each of the 5 participants decides separately the amount of his withdrawal from the group account, from 
0 to 20 ECU. After having chosen the amount that you want to withdraw from the group account (by 
indicating a number from 0 to 20), you have to press the OK button to validate your choice. 
- Once all your group members have made their decision, your computer screen will indicate the total 
amount of ECU withdrawn from the group account, including your withdrawal. The screen will also 
indicate your payoff in this part. 
- Your payoff is composed of two elements. 
 * First, the amount of your withdrawal from the group account. 
 *Second, your income from the group account. This income equals 30% of the total amount 
remaining in the group account (the amount of the group account is the difference between 100 
and the total amount of withdrawals). Each ECU left in the group account pays 0.3 ECU. 
Thus, your total payoff is calculated by the computer program as follows: 
The payoff of each member in the group is calculated in the same way, which means that each group 
member receives the same income from the group account. 
Suppose that the sum of all the withdrawals in the group equals 40 ECU. The amount left in the group 
account equals 60 ECU. Each group member receives an income from the group account of 30% of 60 
=18 ECU. If the sum of all the withdrawals equals 91 ECU, then the amount left in the group account 
equals 9 ECU. Each group member receives an income from the group account of 30% of 9 =2.7 ECU. 
Each ECU that you withdraw from the group account represents for you a payoff of 1 ECU. If instead, you 
decide to leave this ECU in the group account, then your income from the group account equals 30% of 1 
ECU =0.3 ECU. The income of the other group members increases as well of 0.3 ECU per person. In the 
same way, each ECU left in the group account by the other players increases your payoff. For each ECU 
left by one other group member, you earn 30% of 1 ECU = 0.3 ECU. 
-----
Please, answer the following questions, we will pass to each of you to check your answers. If you have 
any questions or have answered all questions, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will 
come to you and answer your questions in private. 
-----
Control Questions
Please answer the following questions. The group account contains 100 ECU. 
Your payoff = Your withdrawal from the group account 
+ 30% (100 - the total amount of withdrawals in your group)
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1) You withdraw 20 ECU from the group account. Each of the 4 other group members withdraws 20 ECU 
from the group account. 
What is your payoff? ………… ECU
What is the payoff of each other group member? …………ECU
2) Nobody (you neither) withdraws any ECU from the group account. 
What is your payoff? ……….. ECU
What is the payoff of each other group member? ………….ECU
3) Together, 4 other group members withdrew a total amount of 70 ECU from the group account. 
What is your payoff if you withdraw 20 ECU from the group account? …………ECU
What is your payoff if you withdraw 5 ECU from the group account? ………..ECU
4) You withdraw 12 ECU from the group account. 
What is your payoff if other group members withdrew a total amount of 73 ECU? ............ECU 
What is your payoff if other group members withdrew a total amount of 58 ECU? ............ECU 
Instructions for the 7 next parts (distributed after completion of the previous parts)
All of your 4 group members are the same as in previous parts. 
From now on, each part is divided into two stages. The first stage is identical to the one in the previous 
parts. During the second stage, you will have a possibility to modify the payoff of your group members. 
More precisely, you will have to choose between two options: either the possibility to increase, or the 
possibility to decrease the payoff of your other group members. Thus, before the beginning of these 7 new 
parts, you will have to choose which option you would like to see implemented during these 7 parts: 
 -  either the option where you can attribute points that decrease the payoff of other group members 
 - or the option where you can attribute points that increase the payoff of other group members 
You will make this choice only once. The option that will be implemented during the 7 next parts will be 
the one which has obtained the majority of votes from the members of your group of 5 persons.  
You will be informed about the option that has obtained the majority of votes before the beginning of the 
first part. You will not know the number of the participants who chose each of two options. 
The details of these two options are presented below: 
1) Option with the points that increase the payoff of other group members
Each part is divided into two stages: 
- First stage 
At the beginning of each part, a total amount of 100 ECU is put in a group account. The group account 
pays 30% of its amount to each of the 5 group members.  
At the same time as the other 4 group members, you choose the amount of your withdrawal from the 
group account (from 0 to 20 ECU). 
Once all the group members have made their decision, your screen will indicate the total amount of ECU 
left in the group account (by you included). The screen will also indicate your payoff from the first stage. 
As previously, your payoff from the first stage is composed of two elements: 
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* First, the amount of your withdrawal from the group account. 
* Second, your income from the group account. This income equals 30% of the total amount left in 
the group account (the amount of the group account is the difference between 100 and the total 
amount of withdrawals).  
Thus, your first-stage payoff is calculated by the computer program as follows: 
- Second stage 
Now, each of you has the possibility to increase or leave unchanged the payoff of each other group 
member by assigning points. You can assign from 0 to 10 points to each group member. Each point 
assigned to a participant increases his first-stage payoff by 2 ECU.
In the same manner, your payoff can be modified if the other members of your group want it. 
* You are informed about the amount that each of the 4 other participants withdrew from the group 
account during the first stage. Beware: the order in which the decisions of the 4 other players are displayed 
on the screen is randomly modified during each part (This means that, for example, the number which will 
appear as the first one on your screen will usually not match the decision of the same participant). 
* Then, you decide the number of points that you want to assign to each of the 4 other group members, to 
increase or to maintain their payoff. For each member, each received point increases his payoff from the 
first stage by 2 ECU.  
If you assign 0 point to another member, you do not change his payoff. If you assign him 1 point, you 
increase his first-stage payoff by 2 points; if you assign him 2 points you increase his payoff by 4 ECU, 
etc. Therefore, the number of points you assign defines by how much you want to increase his first-stage 
payoff. You have to enter a value from 0 to 10 points, for each group member. If you do not want to 
increase the payoff of another member, you need to enter 0. 
If you assign points, you incur a cost, which depends on the number of points assigned to each group 
member. Each assigned point reduces your first-stage payoff by 1 ECU.  
The total cost equals the sum of the each point’s cost assigned to each of the 4 other group members. If 
you assign 2 points to one group member, it costs you 2 ECU. If you assign 9 points to another group 
member, it costs you 9 ECU more. If you assign 0 points to two other members, it does not cost you 
anything more. In this case, the total cost of the points you have assigned equals 11 ECU (2+9+0+0). 
The following example corresponds to the figure that will appear on your computer screen: 
Your first-stage payoff = Your withdrawal from the group account
+ 30% (100 - the total amount of withdrawals in your group) 
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Your final payoff for each part is now calculated by the computer as follows: 
For example, if you received 3 points from all other group members, this increases your first-stage payoff 
by 6 ECU. If you received 10 points, this increases your first-stage payoff by 20 ECU. 
However, note that the payoff from the received points cannot exceed your first-stage payoff. 
At the end of each period, the new one starts automatically and the group receives a new endowment of 
100 ECU. 
2) Option with the points that decrease the gain of other group members
Each part is divided into two stages: 
- First stage
The first stage is identical to the one described with the option with the points that increase the payoff of 
other group members. Thus, your first-stage payoff is calculated as follows: 
Your final payoff = your first-stage payoff + payoff from received points – cost of assigned points
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- Second stage
Now, each of you has the possibility to decrease or leave unchanged the payoff of each other group 
member by assigning points. You can assign from 0 to 10 points to each group member. Each point 
assigned to a participant decreases his first-stage payoff by 2 ECU.
In the same manner, your payoff can be modified if the other members of your group want it. 
* You are informed about the amount that each of the 4 other participants withdrew from the group 
account during the first stage. Beware: the order in which the decisions of the 4 other players are displayed 
on the screen is randomly modified during each part (This means that, for example, the number which will 
appear as the first one on your screen will usually not match the decision of the same participant). 
* Then, you decide the number of points that you want to assign to each of the 4 other group members, to 
decrease or to maintain their payoff. For each member, each received point decreases his payoff from the 
first stage by 2 ECU.  
If you assign 0 point to another member, you do not change his payoff. If you assign him 1 point, you 
decrease his first-stage payoff by 2 points ; if you assign him 2 points you decrease his payoff by 4 ECU, 
etc. Therefore, the number of points you assign defines by how much you want to decrease his first-stage 
payoff. You have to enter a value from 0 to 10 points, for each group member. If you do not want to 
decrease the payoff of another member, you need to enter 0. 
If you assign points, you incur a cost, which depends on the number of points assigned to each group 
member. Each assigned point reduces your first-stage payoff by 1 ECU. The total cost you will incur 
equals the sum of the each point’s cost assigned to each of the 4 other group members. 
The following example corresponds to the figure that will appear on your computer screen: 
Your first-stage payoff = Your withdrawal from the group account
+ 30% (100 - the total amount of withdrawals in your group) 
A
C
C
E
P
T
E
D
 M
A
N
U
S
C
R
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
 
 
48
Your final payoff for each part is now calculated by the computer as follows : 
For example, if you received 3 points from all other group members, this decreases your first-stage payoff 
by 6 ECU. If you received 10 points, this decreases your first-stage payoff by 20 ECU. 
However, note that the cost from the received points cannot exceed your first-stage payoff. 
Your payoff at the end of the second stage can thus be negative, if the cost of the points you have assigned 
exceeds your first-stage payoff. However, you can always avoid losses by your decisions. 
At the end of each period, the new one starts automatically and the group receives a new endowment of 
100 ECU. 
-----
If you have any questions or have answered all questions, please raise your hand and one of the 
experimenters will come to you and answer your questions in private. 
-----
Your final payoff = your first-stage payoff – cost from received points – cost of assigned points
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Control Questions
Please answer the following questions. 
Suppose that the option with assignment of points that increase the others’ payoff has been chosen by the
majority. What is your cost if you assign 2 points in total? 
………… ECU 
Suppose that the option with assignment of points that increase the others’ payoff has been chosen by the 
majority. By how much will your first-stage payoff increase if you receive a total of 2 points from other 
group members? …………ECU
Suppose that the option with assignment of points that decrease the others’ payoff has been chosen by the 
majority. What is your cost if you assign 2 points in total? 
………… ECU 
Suppose that the option with assignment of points that decrease the others’ payoff has been chosen by the 
majority. By how much will your first-stage payoff decrease if you receive a total of 2 points from other 
group members? …………ECU
-----
Instructions for the 7 next parts (distributed after completion of the previous parts)
You remained matched with the same four other group members as in previous parts. During each of the 7 
next  parts, the option with assignment of points that increase the others’ payoff has been implemented 
automatically without the group member’s vote.
The other rules remain similar as before. 
-----
Instructions for the 7 next parts (distributed after completion of the previous parts)
You remained matched with the same four other group members as in previous parts. During each of the 7 
next parts, the option with assignment of points that decrease the others’ payoff has been implemented 
automatically without the group member’s vote.
The other rules remain similar as before. 
-----
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Appendix B. Instructions for a sequence Baseline- Reward-Sanction-Vote in the VCM game 
(translated from French) 
The instructions for parts 1 and 2 are similar as those in Appendix A. They are omitted here. 
Instructions for the 10 next parts (distributed after completion of the previous part)
During the next parts all the transactions will be conducted in ECU (Experimental Currency Units). At the 
end of the session, the total amount of ECU you have earned in each of the following parts will be added 
and converted to Euro at the rate of : 
100 ECU = 1 Euro 
The computer program will randomly form groups of 5 participants each. During all the next parts of this 
experiment, you will interact with the same 4 other persons. You will never know their identity. 
Description of each part 
At the beginning of each part, each of the 5 participants forming a group chooses the individual amount that he wants 
to contribute to a group account, from 0 to 20 ECU. Then, the group account is shared between them. This amount is 
a result of the individual contributions of 5 group members. 
Each part runs in the following detailed manner. 
- At the beginning of each part, each participant receives an endowment of 20 ECU. 
- Each of the 5 participants decides separately the amount of the endowment that he wants to contribute to the group 
account, from 0 to 20 ECU. After having chosen the amount that you want to contribute to the group account (by 
indicating a number from 0 to 20), you have to press the OK button to validate your choice. 
- Once all your group members have made their decision, your computer screen will indicate the total amount of 
ECU contributed to the group account, including your contribution. The screen will also indicate your payoff in 
this part. 
- Your payoff is composed of two elements. 
* First, the amount of the endowment that you kept for yourself (that is to say 20 ECU – your 
contribution to the group account) 
* Second, your income from the group account. This income equals 30% of the total amount in the 
group account (the amount on the group account equals the sum of the individual contributions). 
Indeed, each ECU allocated to the group account pays 0.3 ECU. 
Thus, your total gain is calculated by the computer program as follows: 
The payoff of each member in the group is calculated in the same way, which means that each group 
member receives the same income from the group account
Suppose that the sum of the individual contributions equals 60 ECU.  In this example, each group member receives 
an income from the group account which equals 30% of 60 =18 ECU. If the sum of the contributions to the group 
account equals 9 ECU, then each group member receives an income from the group account which equals 30% of 9 
= 2.7 ECU. 
Your payoff = (20 – Your contribution to the group account)
+ 30% (the sum of all the individual contributions in your group)
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Each ECU of your endowment that you keep for yourself represents for you a payoff of 1 ECU. If instead, you 
decide to allocate this ECU to the group account, then the total contribution to the group account increases by 1 
ECU. That means that the income from the group account increases by 30% of 1 ECU =0.3 ECU. The income of the 
other group members increases as well of 0.3 ECU per person. Hence, the total income of the group account 
increases by 1.5 ECU. This means that your contribution to the group account increases also the income of the other 
group members. 
In the same way, each ECU allocated to the group account by the other players increases your payoff. For each ECU 
assigned by another group member, you earn 30% of 1 ECU = 0.3 ECU. 
------ 
Please, answer the following questions, we will pass to each of you to verify your answers.  If you have any 
questions or have answered all questions, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to you and 
answer your questions in private. 
------ 
Control Questions 
Please answer the following questions. Each group member receives an endowment of 20 ECU. 
1) Nobody (you neither) contributes any ECU to the group account. 
What is your payoff? ………… ECU
What is the payoff of each other group member? …………ECU
2) You contribute 20 ECU to the group account. Each of 4 the other group members contributes 20 ECU to the group 
account. 
What is your payoff? ………… ECU
What is the payoff of each other group member? …………ECU
3) Together, 4 other group members allocate 30 ECU to the group account. 
What is your payoff if you contribute 0 ECU to the group account? …………ECU
What is your payoff if you contribute 15 ECU to the group account? ………..ECU
4) You contribute 8 ECU to the common account. 
What is your payoff if the other group members contributed a total amount of 7 ECU? ............ECU 
What is your payoff if the other group members contributed a total amount of 22 ECU? ............ECU 
----- 
Instructions for the 7 next parts (distributed after completion of the previous parts)
All of your 4 group members are the same as in previous parts. From now on, each part is divided into two 
stages. 
- First stage
At the beginning of each part, each participant receives an endowment of 20 ECU. 
At the same time as the other 4 group members, you choose the amount of your contribution to the group account 
(from 0 to 20 ECU). 
Once all the group members have made their decision, your screen will indicate the total amount of ECU contributed 
to the group account, including your contribution. The screen will also indicate your payoff from the fist stage. 
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As previously, your payoff from the first stage is composed of two elements: 
o First, the amount of the endowment that you kept for yourself (that is to say 20 ECU –your 
contribution to the group account) 
o Second, your income from the group account. This income equals 30% of the total of the 5 
individual contributions to the group account.  
Thus, your first-stage payoff is calculated by the computer program as follows: 
- Second stage
Now, each of you has the possibility to decrease or leave unchanged the payoff of each other group 
member by assigning points. You can assign from 0 to 10 points to each group member. Each point 
assigned to a participant decreases his first-stage payoff by 2 ECU.
In the same manner, your payoff can be modified if the other members of your group want it. 
* You are informed about the amount that each of the 4 other participants contributed to the group account 
during the first stage. Beware: the order in which the decisions of the 4 other players are displayed on the 
screen is randomly modified during each part (This means that, for example, the number which will 
appear as the first one on your screen will usually not match the decision of the same participant). 
* Then, you decide the number of points that you want to assign to each of the 4 other group members, to 
decrease or to maintain their payoff. For each member, each received point decreases his payoff from the 
first stage by 2 ECU.  
If you assign 0 point to another member, you do not change his payoff. If you assign him 1 point, you 
decrease his first-stage payoff by 2 points; if you assign him 2 points you decrease his payoff by 4 ECU, 
etc. Therefore, the number of points you assign defines by how much you want to decrease his first-stage 
payoff. You have to enter a value from 0 to 10 points, for each group member. If you do not want to 
decrease the payoff of another member, you need to enter 0. 
If you assign points, you incur a cost, which depends on the number of points assigned to each group 
member. Each assigned point reduces your first-stage payoff by 1 ECU.  
The total cost equals the sum of the each point’s cost assigned to each of the 4 other group members. If 
you assign 2 points to one group member, it costs you 2 ECU. If you assign 9 points to another group 
member, it costs you 9 ECU more. If you assign 0 points to two other members, it does not cost you 
anything more. In this case, the total cost of the points you have assigned equals 11 ECU (2+9+0+0). 
The following example corresponds to the figure that will appear on your computer screen: 
Your first stage payoff = (20 – Your contribution to the group account)
+ 30% (the sum of all the individual contributions in your group)
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Your final payoff for each part is now calculated by the computer as follows: 
For example, if you received 3 points from all other group members, it reduces your first-stage payoff by 6 ECU. 
If you received 10 points, this reduces your first-stage payoff by 20 ECU. 
However, note that the cost from the received points cannot exceed your first-stage payoff. 
Your payoff at the end of the second stage can thus be negative, if the cost of the points you have assigned 
exceeds your first-stage payoff. However, you can always avoid losses by your decisions. 
At the end of each period, the new one starts automatically and you receive a new endowment of 20 ECU. 
-----
If you have any questions or have answered all questions, please raise your hand and one of the 
experimenters will come to you and answer your questions in private. 
----- 
Control Questions 
Please, answer the following questions, we will pass to each of you to verify your answers. If you have any questions 
or have answered all questions, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will come to you. 
1) Suppose that in the second stage, you assign the following points to other group members: 9, 5 and 0. What is 
the total cost of the points you assigned? ……………….ECU
2) What is the cost if you assign 2 points in total? ………..ECU
3) By how much will your first-stage payoff decrease if you receive a total of 2 points from other group 
members? …………ECU
Your final payoff = your first-stage payoff – costs of received points – cost of assigned points
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----- 
Instructions for the 7 next parts (distributed after completion of the previous parts)
All of your 4 group members are the same as in previous parts. Each part is divided in two stages. 
- First stage
The first stage is identical to the first stage in the previous 7 parts. At the beginning of each part, each participant 
receives an endowment of 20 ECU. In the same time as the other 4 group members, you choose the amount of your 
contribution to the group account (from 0 to 20 ECU). 
As previously, your first-stage payoff is calculated by the computer as follows: 
- Second stage 
Now, each of you has the possibility to increase or leave unchanged the payoff of each other group 
member by assigning points. You can assign from 0 to 10 points to each group member. Each point 
assigned to a participant increases his first-stage payoff by 2 ECU.
In the same manner, your payoff can be modified if the other members of your group want it. 
* You are informed about the amount that each of the 4 other participants contributed to the group account 
during the first stage. Beware: the order in which the decisions of the 4 other players are displayed on the 
screen is randomly modified during each part (This means that, for example, the number which will 
appear as the first one on your screen will usually not match the decision of the same participant). 
* Then, you decide the number of points that you want to assign to each of the 4 other group members, to 
increase or to maintain their payoff. For each member, each received point increases his payoff from the 
first stage by 2 ECU.  
If you assign 0 point to another member, you do not change his payoff. If you assign him 1 point, you 
increase his first-stage payoff by 2 points ; if you assign him 2 points you increase his payoff by 4 ECU, 
etc. Therefore, the number of points you assign defines by how much you want to increase his first-stage 
payoff. You have to enter a value from 0 to 10 points, for each group member. If you do not want to 
increase the payoff of another member, you need to enter 0. 
If you assign points, you incur a cost, which depends on the number of points assigned to each group 
member. Each assigned point reduces your first-stage payoff by 1 ECU.  
As previously, the total cost equals the sum of the each point’s cost assigned to each of the 4 other group
members.  
The following example corresponds to the figure that will appear on your computer screen: 
Your first-stage payoff = (20 – Your contribution to the group account)
                         + 30% (the sum of all the individual contributions in your group)
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Your final payoff for each part is now calculated by the computer as follows: 
For example, if you received 3 points from all other group members, this increases your first-stage payoff 
by 6 ECU. If you received 10 points, this increases your first-stage payoff by 20 ECU. 
However, note that the payoff from the received points cannot exceed your first-stage payoff. 
At the end of each period, the new one starts automatically and you receive a new endowment of 20 ECU. 
----- 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will answer your questions in private. 
------- 
Instructions for the 7 next parts (distributed after completion of the previous parts)
All of your 4 group members are the same as in previous parts. Before the beginning of these 7 new parts, you 
have to choose which option you would like to see implemented during these 7 parts: 
- Either the option where you can assign points that decrease the first-stage payoff of other group members 
Your final payoff = your first-stage payoff + payoff from received points – cost of assigned points
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- Or the option where you can assign points that increase the first-stage payoff of other group members 
You will make this choice only once. The option that will be implemented during the 7 next parts will be 
the one which has obtained the majority of votes from the members of your group of 5 persons. 
You will be informed about the option that has obtained the majority of votes before the beginning of the first part. 
You will not know the number of participants who chose each of the two options. 
As previously, during each of these 7 parts, you will receive an endowment of 20 ECU. 
- During the first stage, you choose the amount that you want to contribute to the group account, from 0 to 20 ECU. 
- During the second stage, you choose the number of points from 0 to 10 that you want to assign to the other group 
members. 
---- 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and one of the experimenters will answer your questions in private. 
 
--
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Appendix Table A1. First-stage and final payoffs per treatment
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Treatments First-stage 
payoffs
Final 
payoffs
First-stage payoffs Final payoffs
all games all games Taking 
Game
Giving 
Game
Taking 
Game
Giving 
Game
Baseline 
treatment
22.96
(5.96)
22.96
(5.96)
22.73
(6.18)
23.24
(5.66)
22.73
(6.18)
23.24
(5.66)
Sanction 
treatment
25.94
(5.61)
18.84
(11.62)
25.45
(6.54)
26.55
(4.09)
17.33
(12.95)
20.72
(9.39)
Reward 
treatment
24.74
(6.79)
26.88
(8.95)
24.16
(7.24)
25.47
(6.11)
26.23
(9.61)
27.70
(7.99)
Vote Sanction
treatment 
28.91
(5.27)
24.10
(7.41)
28.53
(6.01)
29.54
(3.71)
22.18
(7.85)
27.31
(5.24)
Vote Reward 
treatment
24.13
(6.38)
26.65
(9.56)
23.68
(6.79)
24.64
(5.85)
26.28
(10.79)
27.08
(7.91)
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Appendix Table A2. Determinants of payoffs
GLS models
Dependent variables
First-stage 
payoff
First-stage 
payoff Final payoff Final payoff
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sanction treatment 3.234*** 3.232*** -3.692*** -3.694***
(0.276) (0.276) (0.406) (0.406)
Reward treatment 2.071*** 2.069*** 4.397*** 4.395***
(0.285) (0.285) (0.419) (0.419)
Vote Sanction treatment 5.578*** 5.557*** 0.117 0.095
(0.450) (0.450) (0.661) (0.661)
Vote Reward treatment 1.698*** 1.701*** 4.656*** 4.659***
(0.295) (0.295) (0.434) (0.434)
Giving Game 0.909* 0.909* 1.631** 1.490**
(0.501) (0.511) (0.685) (0.697)
Treatment order -0.342***
(0.104)
-0.341***
(0.104)
-0.424***
(0.152)
-0.423***
(0.152)
Period -0.272*** -0.272*** -0.271*** -0.271***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.048) (0.048)
Last period -0.249 -0.249 -0.726** -0.726**
(0.227) (0.227) (0.334) (0.334)
Police 0.477 0.630 0.361 0.731
(0.575) (0.589) (0.786) (0.804)
Police in activity -0.739 -2.12
#
(0.990) (1.351)
Number of police subjects 
in the group
0.634**
(0.266)
0.753**
(0.363)
Age -0.117*** -0.118*** -0.197*** -0.197***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.043) (0.042)
Male 0.021 0.227 0.063 0.311
(0.538) (0.540) (0.735) (0.737)
Trust -0.175 -0.185 -0.031 -0.050
(0.137) (0.135) (0.187) (0.185)
Political orientation 0.038 0.050 0.267 0.270*
(0.119) (0.119) (0.163) (0.162)
Constant 27.391*** 26.020*** 27.774*** 26.244***
(1.125) (1.270) (1.541) (1.736)
N
Wald Chi 
2
R
2
5580
508.04
0.10
5580
515.09
0.11
5580
1066.59
0.15
5580
1074.48
0.16
Note: Baseline treatment in the Taking Game is the reference category. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, *, 
and 
#
 indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10, and 0.12 levels, respectively for the two-tailed test. The 5580 
observations correspond to the 180 subjects observed in 31 periods of game. 
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Norm Enforcement in Social Dilemmas 
An Experiment with Police Commissioners 
 
 
HIGHLIGHTS 
 
· We study norm enforcement in the context of social dilemmas, using a Giving Game and 
a Taking Game. 
· A sample of police commissioner subjects is compared to typical student subjects. 
· Police subjects cooperate more and punish more than non-police, ceteris paribus. 
· Subjects prefer rewards to enforce norms, but police are more likely to vote for 
sanctions compared to other subjects. 
· Police subjects reward and sanction more than others when the institution results from 
a majority vote. 
